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This paper makes the case for applying a systems perspective to the analysis of 
hospital-based infection outbreaks. Most of the research that has been 
conducted on behavioural aspects of infection control has focused on 
explanations at an individual level of analysis (e.g., interventions to improve 
hand washing). The infections outbreaks at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
NHS Trust are analysed in detail using an established framework for risk 
management. The paper further outlines the human and organisational issues 
raised by the analysis and provides a means through which these aspects of 
infection can be highlighted as part of a future research agenda within systems 
ergonomics. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Within the last few years the subject of hospital infection control has become the subject of 
much media attention (e.g., BBC Panorama, 2008). A number of high profile hospital outbreaks 
within the UK involving bacterium such as Clostridium difficile (C. diff.)  and MRSA 
(Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) and the number of mortalities resulting from 
these outbreaks, has made infection control into a central priority for the UK NHS and other 
health care systems worldwide (Allegranzi et al., 2007). Much of the debate so far has 
concentrated on improving hygiene within hospitals (e.g., hand washing), very little research 
has been conducted on the wider behavioural, social and organisational factors that may also 
determine infection control outbreaks (Griffiths, Renz and Rafferty, 2008).  
 
The intention of the present study is to consider the potential of adopting a systems ergonomic 
perspective towards hospital-based infections. More specifically, the paper describes the 
advantages to be gained from applying existing systems analysis techniques to infection 
outbreaks and using these to draw out both lessons learnt as well as strategies for improvement. 
In order to demonstrate  the value of such an approach the paper focuses on a specific case 
study namely, the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust outbreaks which occurred 
between 2005-2007 (Healthcare Commission, 2007). 
 
Systems analysis and systems ergonomics 
 
Hospitals represent a good example of a complex large-scale sociotechnical system involving a 
large diversity of professions spanning a range of roles and specialisms as well as technologies 
that range from the latest eHealth applications (e.g., electronic records) to more established 
aspects such as physical design components (e.g., wards and buildings). Within systems 
ergonomics, Rasmussen (1997) has provided a modelling framework for understanding the 
dynamic interaction between levels within large-scale sociotechnical systems. Vicente and 
Christoffersen (2006) have used the modelling framework to identify the lessons learnt from the 
May 2000 outbreak of E. coli which occurred in Walkerton, Canada. Their analysis used a 
graphical representation of the contributing factors that led up to the Walkerton outbreak. These 
ranged from decisions made  at governmental levels (e.g., privatisation initiatives), the action of 
actors within the system (e.g., failures to take water samples), as well as equipment failures 
(e.g., shallow water wells). In the next section the main events leading up to the outbreaks at 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells are outlined. These are used to suggest ways in which the 
outbreak could be analysed in more detail, and modelled using the Rasmussen and Vicente 
frameworks. 
 
 
The Clostridium difficile outbreaks in the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust 
 
Background to the outbreaks and timeline 
During the period between April 2004 and September 2006 an estimated 90 people died at the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust as a result of becoming infected with the 
Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) bacteria (Healthcare Commission, 2007, p.5). C. diff. is the major 
cause of serious bacterial infectious diarrhoea acquired in hospitals in the UK and is particularly 
resistant to drying, chemical disinfectants and alcohol. The main events at the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust are summarised in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary timeline of infection outbreaks 
Time Period Event 
April 2000 Trust established following merger between two other local NHS 
Trusts 
2001/2-2005 High turnover of senior managers and period of organizational 
stability 
October 2005 - 
September 2006 
More than 500 patients developed the infection, 60 patients 
estimated to have died due to C. difficile infection. 
Before 2005 Trust has a high level of infection with C. difficile but no one in 
the trust or local health authority was aware of this 
Autumn 2005 Number of patients infected doubles. Approximately 150 patients 
affected, a number of whom died as a result of the infection. (first 
outbreak) 
April – Sept. 2006 258 patients in total affected 
Beginning 2006 Number of newly infected patients declines. 
April 2006 Trust recognizes it has a major outbreak and reports this to 
strategic health authority and health protection unit. (second 
outbreak) 
April 2007 Healthcare Commission finds unacceptable examples of the use of 
contaminated equipment 
October 2007 Healthcare Commission Report published. 
 
Contributory factors leading up to the outbreaks 
The Healthcare Commission (2007, HC, 2007) report identified a number of factors that 
contributed to the outbreaks that occurred with the Trust. These can be summarised in terms of 
five main themes: the role played by external organisations; management of the trust; clinical 
management on the hospital  wards; the role played by the infection control team; and,  
equipment and hygiene factors. 
 
The role of external organisations 
Within the report both the setting of government-led targets and financial pressures on NHS 
Trusts are mentioned as background, contributory factors that had an impact on the day-to-day 
operation of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust. In particular, the report mentions the 
need for Trust board members and managers to meet targets for the use of beds. Higher bed 
occupancy meant that there was less time for the cleaning and a higher probability of 
transmission of infection between patients (HC, 2007, pp.69-70).  The need to meet financial 
targets such as spending on equipment and buildings also placed pressure on the Trust to cut 
back in areas that impacted upon infection control such as financing for new buildings and 
isolation areas. 
 
Infection control within the UK NHS is regulated by a number of bodies including the Health 
Protection Agency (HPA). The remit of the HPA is to provide advice and support to NHS, local 
authorities and other agencies with regard to public health issues.  The creation of the HPA in 
April 2005 coincided with the first outbreak at the Trust. One part of the HPA, the health 
protection unit (HPU), was set up in order to support organisations in their management of 
infections. The report highlights that this caused some confusion within the Trust at the time of 
the outbreaks, as the expectation was that the HPU could give provide guidance covering the 
supervision and monitoring of infection control. The HPU did not have close involvement with 
the Trust and generally worked in a reactive way, responding to concerns as they arose (HC, 
2007, p. 8).  Similar problems were encountered within the much larger Strategic Health 
Authority (SHA) who are responsible for implementing government policy and fiscal control 
within regions of the UK. 
 
Management of the Trust 
The report describes a catalogue of problems and failures associated with the management of 
the trust at the time of the outbreaks. In terms of clinical risks and incidents, management 
strategy in general “had been fragmentary and poorly understood” (HC, 2007, p. 77). The 
reports from an internal group set up within the Trust in order to analyse complaints, claims and 
incidents highlight, amongst others, the following issues:   the unsatisfactory nature of some 
“escalation” areas (areas temporarily set up to deal with infected patients); the impact that the 
accident and emergency (A&E) target had on the quality of care; poor quality handover and 
transfer to wards from A&E; concerns about staffing levels, and, bank staff managing wards on 
some shifts. 
The style of leadership within the Trust and the overall management culture are criticised in the 
report. Many staff described the leadership of the chief executive as being “autocratic” or 
“dictatorial” (HC, 2007 p. 91). The report concluded that the person appointed as director of 
infection prevention and control had “no real understanding of the role at the outset” (HC, 
2007, p. 5). Turnover of managers and directors was also high. 
 
Finally, the trust’s management of staffing is criticised heavily within the report in several 
places. The number of nurses working on wards had fallen since the period 2002/03. and at the 
same time the number of beds had also reduced. In 2006/07 the number of nurse per bed was 
1.52, the same number as in 2003/04 (HC, 2007, p. 82). Trust managers had not carried out a 
comprehensive review of staffing levels or a determination of minimum staffing levels. 
Clinical management on the hospital wards 
A review of the case notes of 50 patients who had died having had C. diff. found that in 80% of 
the cases, at least one element of the clinical management, or monitoring of C. diff at ward level 
was unsatisfactory (HC, 2007, p. 4). A number of elements were mentioned, including: 
infrequent reviews of patients by doctors; lack of systematic monitoring as to whether or not a 
patient was recovering from C. diff.; and, failure to change antibiotic treatment when a patient 
failed to respond to the initial treatment (HC, 2007, p. 4). Delays in starting treatment occurred 
on the wards, mostly because there was a delay in sending samples for analysis (HC, 1007, p. 
33). There was also little evidence that once C. diff. had been diagnosed, that patients were 
monitored for severe signs of the infection (HC, 2007, p. 34). In other cases, it was clear that 
diagnoses were either not considered or had been missed. In 34% of the cases reviewed, 
medical records did not indicate that a regular review of C. diff had taken place (HC, 2007, p. 
38). The management of fluids and nutrition on the wards was also inconsistent. In 36% of the 
cases  there was evidence of poor fluid management and in 34% nutritional needs had not been 
assessed or managed (HC, 2007, p. 38).  
 
The infection control team 
The role played by the infection control team within the trust was a complex one and one made 
difficult by problems relating to accountability, the amount of resources available to them and 
their ability to function as a team. The arrangements for accountability were not clear (HC, 
2007, p. 54) and it was not clear who was responsible for the team. Infection control nurses 
were accountable to the director of nursing, however, the pathology manager held the budget 
for these nurses, but did not consider that he had any management responsibly for infection 
control. Not until September 2006 did the trust take steps to clarify the management of the team 
(HC, 2007, p. 51). 
 
Equipment and hygiene 
Hygiene practices within the trust and the state of hospital buildings contributed a great deal to 
the outbreaks. Wards, bathrooms and commodes were not clean and patients had in some cases 
to share equipment (e.g., Zimmer frames) which were not cleaned before use (HC, 2007, p. 4). 
The infection control team were keen to isolate patients once they had been identified as C. diff. 
cases, however the scarcity of side rooms made this difficult. As a result many patients before 
and after the outbreaks were kept on open wards. The design of buildings and their age meant 
that many wards did not have sufficient space for storage or the provision of hand basins in 
utility rooms. The buildings in the trust were generally old or in a poor state of repair and when 
they were first opened di not have adequate cleaning and laundry services (HC, 2007, p. 6). 
 
Analysing the outbreaks: A systems perspective 
 
The outbreaks which occurred within the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust represent the 
combined impact of a complex set of factors extending over several years. In common with 
most examples of accidents, disasters or large-scale adverse events, the outbreaks are best 
interpreted as arising through the combination of a number of interrelated systemic factors and 
influences (Turner, 1978; Reason, 1995). Figure 1 attempts to use some of the elements of 
Rasmussen’s (1997) risk management framework in order to further analyse the outbreaks. In 
order to illustrate the framework as it applies to the outbreaks, a small sample of the 
contributory factors are used to link together some  of the system components. In the following 
sections, the various levels and the boundaries between them, are examined in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mapping of infection outbreak influencing factors with system levels and 
boundaries 
 
 
Government, regulatory bodies and trust governance 
At the very highest level of the system it is difficult to isolate the role played by government-set 
targets as a contributory factor leading to the outbreaks. Targets placed many individuals, 
particularly those at trust board and management levels under a great deal of pressure. This 
pressure in itself may have led them to make poor decisions, and in some cases to prioritise bed 
occupancy rates at the expense of the risk of an infection outbreak.  Previous research on the 
influence that targets have on management decision-making in health care tends to be 
equivocal. Bean and Hood (2006) for example, show that the impact of satisfying a specific 
target (e.g., hospital waiting times) has not been analysed in terms of how this influences other 
related services (e.g., quality of care). Others have suggested that health care targets represent: 
“tin openers rather than dials … they do not give answers but prompt further investigation and 
inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate answer” (Carter, Klein and 
Day, 1995). Within the trust it is likely that targets exerted considerable pressure on the system 
as a whole and this pressure filtered down various levels of the system. It is possible that the 
drive to comply with these targets increased the likelihood of an adverse event or set of events 
taking place at some stage within the trust. 
 
Poor communication, confusion of responsibilities and accountabilities between and within the 
various regulatory bodies delayed the time in which they could react to the outbreaks. A 
separate report by the Healthcare Commission (2008) examined the underlying causes of 
serious failures in NHS health care providers and identified large-scale organisational processes 
such as mergers and poor change management procedures as common factors. Within the wider 
literature on disasters (e.g., Perrow, 1999) the nature of organisational linkages and structures 
are also widely acknowledged to be significant explanatory factors. 
 
Hospital management 
Within the hospital the actions of senior managers were identified as significantly contributing 
to the failure to prevent and deal with the outbreaks. The link between management, human 
resource management (HRM) practices and work performance outcomes has been investigated 
in detail in the last few years. Wood and Wall (2002) for example, reviewed the evidence that 
suggests there is a link between high-involvement HRM practices and employee productivity. 
High involvement HRM practices typically include empowering employees to make their own 
decisions and the presence of self-managed teams. The review showed that there these types of 
practices in organisations do tend to increase levels of employee productivity. Similar effects 
have been shown between HRM practices and measurements of safety outcomes (e.g., number 
of adverse events). In general, there is strong evidence to suggest that aspects of management 
behaviour partially shape and determine the culture of safety within organisations (e.g., Zohar, 
2000). Within health care specifically, West et al. (2002) carried out a large-scale survey of the 
relationship between HRM practices and general in-hospital mortality. The survey showed 
some aspect of high involvement HRM were associated with lower mortality rates after 
adjustment for patient and hospital characteristics. 
 
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, the questions still remains as 
to why they ignored, or at least failed to realise the seriousness of the outbreaks and their 
consequences. Many of the managers interviewed in the original Healthcare Commission report 
reported that they were aware of how serious the situation had become within the trust, but 
were powerless to do anything about it. One possible explanation is what Vaughan (1996) in 
her study of the Challenger shuttle disaster termed the “normalization of deviance”, namely that 
managers over time began to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk within the 
Trust. Only after the level of risk built up to a point where it could not be controlled, did they 
begin to realise the gravity of the situation. 
 
Clinical management and equipment and buildings 
Understaffing and general lack of resources together played a part in the outbreaks. Staffing 
ratios and levels of staff morale almost certainly contributed to the problem of containing the 
spread of infection on the wards. In general, the research literature provides some evidence that 
lower levels of staffing increase the likelihood of infections occurring. Hugonnet et al. (2004) 
(cited in Griffiths et al., 2008) examined the numbers of nursing staff and staff downsizing 
relative to infection levels. The researchers found an inverse relationship between staff 
downsizing and the rate of hospital-based infection. Curiously, little research has been 
conducted on the impact of job satisfaction/morale on hospital infection levels, however, work 
in other domains (e.g., manufacturing and service industries) suggests that lower levels of 
satisfaction are clearly linked to lower levels of job performance (e.g., Parker, 2007). 
 
It might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and other health care professionals 
within the trust shares similarities with those of senior managers and trust board managers. 
Many individuals at ward level were aware of the levels of poor hygiene and inadequate patient 
monitoring practices, but saw no way to improve the situation. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) 
analysed data from the Bristol Royal Infirmary Report (2001) and concluded that hospital staff 
became locked into particular lines of action or behaviour where they “search for confirmation 
that they are doing what they should be doing” (p. 73). These so-called “cultures of 
entrapment” inhibit an organisation’s ability to break out of patterns of behaviour that over time 
can lead to adverse outcomes. In the case of the trust they may provide some means with which 
to explain shared boundary spanning behaviours between levels within the hospital subsystem 
(figure 1). 
 
Ways forward and conclusions 
 
The analysis presented in the paper has shown that there are advantages in analysing  hospital-
based infection outbreaks from a system’s perspective. Many of the issues that have been 
discussed have not been researched within the patient safety literature in much depth, 
particularly organisational phenomena  (Waterson, 2008). It is still the case that most research 
within the area of infection control has concentrated on individual levels of analysis (e.g., 
behavioural interventions in the form of hand washing campaigns). The paper has only touched 
upon some of the behavioural issues involved with a system as complex as hospital-based 
healthcare.  Future research should examine causal links between system levels in a more 
systematic manner and address the issue of influences at the meso-level of analysis, that is 
linkages and relationships between individual (macro-) and organisational (macro-) system 
levels (Karsh and Brown, in press). Further empirical studies which focus on behavioural 
aspects of infection control which go beyond individual levels of analysis are needed. In 
addition, there appears some scope for modelling the relationships between system components 
and comparing these models against hospital-based data (e.g.,  Brailsford and Schmidt, 2003). 
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